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DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ADDRESS BLACK 
FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS 
Nineteen eighty-four is a presidential election year. Already, six members of the Democratic Party have declared 
their interest in becoming the next President of the United States, and the campaign is in full swing. Despite the black 
community's historical and growing interest in Africa and the Caribbean, issues relating to these regions have been 
among those least discussed-if they have not been ignored altogether-during a presidential campaign. Indeed, in 
previous elections, when candidates were asked to answer specifically Africa- or Caribbean-related questions, they 
have-more often than not-pleaded for additional time for "further study" of these matters . As a consequence, 
we have had to choose among candidates not knowing their position on issues vital to our community at large. 
But Africa and the Caribbean are unquestionably of increasingly strategic, economic, and political significance to 
the United States. Southern Africa is now clearly a powder keg, waiting to explode. The Third World debt crisis poses 
a serious threat to the international financial system. Civil war, revolution, and counter-revolution in the Caribbean 
Basin also currently confront U.S. policymakers. It is, therefore, important that national debate on the issues affecting 
these regions take place to the fullest extent possible. 
Perhaps, the growing realization of the strength and 
centrality of the black electorate has been demonstrated 
by the willingness of the current presidential candidates 
to break with previous patterns of failing to address black 
world issues. Each of the declared candidates was asked 
to respond for the record to eight questions concerning 
their position on critical foreign policy issues. Five of the 
six-Alan Cranston, John Glenn, Gary Hart, Ernest 
Hollings, .. nd Walter Mondale-answered these questions 
either orally or in writing. Only Reubin Askew was unable 
to schedule an interview before publication. He has, how-
ever, expressed a willingness to answer the questions at 
a later date. 
The candidates have addressed these issues with often 
groundbreaking observations. Under certain conditions, 
most of the candidates would impose sanctions on South 
Africa. Most would recognize Angola. Mbst would ex-
pand dialogue with Cuba. All are critical of current policy 
toward Grenada and Nicaragua. One would apparently 
move more forthrightly toward full normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba. This special issue of TransAfrica Forum 
ISSUE BRIEF presents the results of this survey of the 
candidates as well as a brief biographical description of 
each. 
Presidential Candidates (front row, I to r); 
Walter Mondale, Reubin Askew, John Glenn, 
(back row, I to r) Gary Hart, Ernest Hollings. 
ALAN CRANSTON 
Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from Califor-
nia from 1969 to the present Senate minority whip (assis-
tant Democratic leader) since 1977. 
Congressional Education Associates Congressional 
Ledger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests: 
1981: 90 I 1983: 85 
Senate Committees: Foreign Relations Subcommit-
tees: Western Hemisphere; East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs; Arms Control; Oceans; International Operations 
and Environment 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittees: 
Housing and Urban Affairs; Financial Institutions; Eco-
nomic Policy, Rural Housing, and Development 
Veteran Affairs 
Biographical Information: 
Born: June 19, 1914 in Palo Alto, California 
Education: Mt. View Union High School, Los Altos, 
CA; Pomona College; University of Mexico; Stanford 
University, B.A., 1936. 
Career: Controller of California 1958-1966; President, 
California Democratic Council 1953-1957; National 
President, United World Federalists 1949-1952; Office 
of War Information, Chief, Foreign Language Division 
1940-1944; U.S. Army, World War II; Foreign cor-
respondent, International News Service covering 
England, Germany, Italy, and Ethiopia, 1937-1933; 
Author 
Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 
1980, Cranston defeated Republican Paul Gann. 
Cranston won fifty-seven percent of the vote. 
Alan Cranston announced his candidacy for President 
of the United States on February 2, 1983. 
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If South Africa continues to block progress toward 
United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the 
dismantlement of apartheid at home, would your admin-
istration support the imposition of comprehensive United 
Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what 
measures would you be prepared to take? 
CRANSTON: Two of our principal objectives in 
southern Africa are to gain the prompt independence of 
Namibia and to demonstrate unequivocally to South Afri-
ca our opposition to apartheid. South Africa's refusal to 
dismantle this system of legalized racism must end if there 
is ever going to be peace in southern Africa and if the 
basic human rights of the vast majority of South Africans 
are to be met. So far these goals have eluded us. 
As President, I would not hesitate to use economic 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations against South 
Africa as a tool to end apartheid and to win the indepen-
dence of Namibia. 
There are, however, other options short of comprehen-
sive economic sanctions that I would also employ. These 
other options hold out the promise of significantly affect-
ing South African policy while demonstrating U.S. com-
mitment to its expressed foreign policy objectives. These 
measures have the advantage of being implemented in-
dependently or in concert with other nations. Steps we 
can take include an embargo on air traffic-an action that 
would primarily affect white South Africans. We could 
embargo all nuclear material and information, which 
would affect the South African nuclear industry that the 
government depends upon so heavily to supply its energy 
needs. Instead of relaxing U.S. export controls, par-
ticularly for those commodities that can be used for both 
civilian and military purposes, we could tighten them. 
The Reagan administration has failed completely to use 
this arsenal of options. Instead it has taken the opposite 
track, offering the South African government a number 
of benefits in an attempt to gain its cooperation. This 
policy of "constructive engagement" has failed. There 
is continued stalemate on the Namibian negotiations. Far 
from cooperating in bringing peace to the region of south-
ern Africa, South Africa has stepped up its efforts to de-
stabilize other governments in the area through its mili-
tary incursions into neighboring states' territories. Most 
important, there is little movement toward ending apart-
heid. 
We must forcefully impress upon the present South 
African government our deep commitment to eliminating 
apartheid and to the independence of Namibia. If our 
diplomatic efforts fail, then we must take stronger ac-
tion, including economic sanctions. 
The United States is the only major Western power that 
does not recognize Angola. Would your administration 
normalize relations with Angola. 
CRANSTON: As President, I would move promptly 
toward recognition of Angola. Refusing to recognize 
another nation is generally counterproductive and inef-
fective. U.S. relations with Angola provide a prime ex-
ample of the problems that develop through non-
recognition. 
The United States missed a great opportunity to in-
fluence the new nation of Angola by refusing it recogni-
tion. We helped to increase Angolan reliance on the So-
viet Union and its allies. Eight years after Angolan inde-
pendence, we maintain the charade of non-recognition. 
We must live in the real world. We must work with 
the Angolan government in order to achieve our foreign 
policy objectives in southern Africa. Angola played a key 
role as a Frontline State in the negotiations for Zim-
babwe's independence. And now Angola is a critical play-
er in the negotiations to bring about the independence 
of Namibia. In addition, several U.S. companies have 
major operations in Angola, but they lack the benefit of 
official U.S. representation in Angola. Despite all these 
realities, we pretend that Angola does not exist. 
It was a mistake not to recognize Angola eight years 
ago. I see no point in perpetuating what was a poor policy 
from the start. 
Would your administration seek a normalization of re-
lations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you 
propose? 
CRANSTON: I believe that since we recognize the Soviet 
Union-despite our abhorrence of its methods of gov-
erning-we should certainly begin a process aimed at es-
tablishing relations with Cuba. The fact that we abhor 
many of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies is no ex-
cuse for withholding recognition from this country so 
close to our shores. As President, I would seek to begin 
discussions on the bilateral issues, such as trade, that have 
been outstanding for nearly twenty-five years . The U.S 
would certainly benefit from a resolution of the immigra-
tion question, as well as U.S. claims on property nation-
alized following the Cuban revolution. The airline anti-
hijacking agreement has been successful. We have been 
able to reach agreement with the Cuban government in 
the past, and I am confident that we can work to find 
some areas of mutual agreement in the future . I strongly 
believe that improving relations with Cuba could also 
lessen tensions in this hemisphere. 
How would your administration's policies toward Gre-
nada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan 
administration? 
CRANSTON: First of all, I would immediately halt all 
operations-covert or overt-aimed at overthrowing the 
government of Nicaragua. We cannot hope to ease the 
tensions in the region if we are carrying on a ' secret' war 
against Nicaragua. We must halt the self-defeating 'co-
vert' aid given by the Reagan administration to the rem-
nants of Somoza supporters. This aid serves only to un-
dermine the moderate forces remaining in Nicaragua, and 
it gives the Sandinistas justification for their otherwise 
unjustifiable military build-up and heavy reliance on the 
Cuban military. 
I think the Reagan administration has made the same 
policy mistake with both Nicaragua and Grenada. It has 
assumed that leftist governments in the Caribbean region 
are committed to opposing the United States. In the case 
of Nicaragua, the administration has assumed that a mil-
itary solution is best. What these operations are really 
doing is strengthening the group currently in power in 
Nicaragua instead of encouraging more moderate ele-
ments. Reagan administration policy toward Grenada is 
not much better. Alarmist pronouncements against that 
country solidify popular support behind the government 
instead of encouraging a dialogue between our two coun-
tries. 
I would like to see the U.S. provide the Nicaraguans 
and the Grenadans with technical help in areas such as 
civil works, agriculture, health, and education. There is 
no reason for us to abdicate these kinds of projects to 
the Cubans and the Soviets . 
And if we are to have peace in the area, I think we must 
include these countries in regional discussions. 
Would your administration support increasing levels of 
development assistance to Africa? 
CRANSTON: Under the Reagan administration, U.S. 
development assistance to Africa has been placed on a 
back burner. As in other areas of the developing world, 
the administration has insisted unwisely on viewing the 
problems of African nations through the distorted prism 
of East-West rivalry, emphasing military assistance over 
economic aid. Yet the problems that most African na-
tions face were not created by communist subversion and 
will not be solved by military actions. To reduce devel-
opmental assistance now is a short-sighted policy that ig-
nores the inter-dependence of the world economy and the 
importance of African nations in this system. We should 
reverse the priorities of the Reagan administration. The 
United States should step up technical as well as finan-
cial assistance to Africa. Trade, an area of critical im-
portance that holds tremendous opportunity for African 
nations and the United States has been neglected by the 
Reagan administration. A greater emphasis on trade pro-
motion will provide greater markets for U.S. businesses 
and will provide African nations with some of the means 
to ensure sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency. 
What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? 
In what specific ways would your administration modify 
it? 
CRANSTON: I support the idea of a Marshall Plan type 
of aid package for the Carribean Basin. Economic stabili-
ty contributes to political stability. I think the needs of 
this region and its importance to the United States have 
been underestimated for too long. The C.B.I. goes part 
of the way toward addressing these needs, but there is 
room for improvement. I have questions about how cer-
tain portions of the C .B.I. will affect U.S. jobs, and I 
will be be studying these elements closely before they 
come up in the Senate. Countries such as Belize and Hon-
duras deserve more aid than the C.B.l. would allot them. 
I do not think the C.B.I. should be a substitute for securi-
ty assistance but rather a comprehensive development as-
sistance program. I am concerned that not enough C.B.l. 
funds are slated for projects which encourage long-term 
development and that proportionately too much of the 
C.B.I. is slated for balance-of-payments support, which 
really only helps in the short-term. I would rather see the 
ratios changed. 
What position would your administration take on African 
regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Sahara? 
CRANSTON: The most constructive role that the United 
States can play in regional conflicts like those in the West-
ern Sahara and in the Horn of Africa is to help bring 
about prompt and peaceful settlement of these disputes. 
A key element of U.S. policy must be recognition of the 
true individuality of the nations of Africa. Too often U.S. 
policy has viewed the nations of Africa either as the 
pawns of East-West rivalry or under the vague generaliza-
tion of "Africa" as if that explains everything. This is 
a tremendous disservice both to the United States and to 
the African nations. It severely limits our effectiveness 
in implementing U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
The origins of the disputes in the Western Sahara and 
in the Horn of Africa stem from the unique situations 
of each region. They will require unique solutions. In the 
Western Sahara we must understand what the needs of 
the people who live in the Western Sahara are as well as 
those of our allies in the area. We should try to help end 
the dispute quickly. It is siphoning off critical resources 
of all the countries involved,and it is destabilizing the en-
tire region. Significant increases in military aid are not 
the solution. Hardheaded, serious political negotiations 
are. We have seen in the Horn of Africa already what 
huge amounts of military assistance poured into a region 
can accomplish: it makes the temptation to resort to mil-
itary solutions overwhelming. 
As President, I would ensure that U.S. policy toward 
regional conflicts in Africa would deemphasize military 
solutions and encourage resolution through African ef-
forts. To this end I believe that we should encourage and 
strengthen continued use of forums like the Organization 
of African Unity and the United Nations. 
What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee 
laws and practice would your administration implement? 
What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other 
black refugees? 
CRANSTON: I strongly believe that refugees with a well-
founded fear of persecution should be eligible for political 
asylum in the U.S., as recognized in the Refugee Act of 
1980. The fairness and impartiality of our refugee policy 
can be guaranteed only by providing judicial review of 
asylum decisions. Without this guarantee, individual ref-
ugees or classes of refugees are at the mercy of an ad-
ministration's political or foreign policy goals, as current-
ly with Haitian "boat people." 
The discriminatory treatment of these Haitian refugees 
is unprecendented in our nation's history. These "boat 
people" risked their lives across 800 miles of ocean to 
seek safety and a chance for a decent life in the United 
States. Then, for over a year, 2,000 of these refugees were 
imprisoned here without bond. The Haitians arrived on 
our shores unfamiliar with English and largely unin-
formed about our legal system. The Immigration and Na-
turalization Service (INS) shuffled them from place to 
place, often to desolate areas of the country, without ad-
mitting legal counsel. It conducted deportation proceed-
ings-including mass hearings-behind closed doors, 
with no one to explain their rights or provide adequate 
translation. It is unjust and cruel for the INS to continue 
threatening this small group of Haitians with forcible de-
portation to Haiti, where they face brutality or imprison-
ment. The uniqueness of their situation and the discrim-
inatory treatment they have already suffered argues that 
these refugees should receive some form of secure legal 
status. 
Overall, our immigration policy must be fair and work-
able. It therefore must include international solutions to 
the problems that create refugees. Our government must 
devote substantial time, effort, and resources to help 
Third World nations develop their own economies to pro-
vide their people with food, jobs, and the opportunity 
to achieve a decent standard of living. 
Any immigration policy that fails to take into account 
America's interdependent relationship with other nations 
is neither realistic nor fair. D 
JOHN H. GLENN, JR. 
Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from Ohio, 
1975 to the present 
Congressional Education Associates Congressional Led-
ger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests: 
1981: 80 / 1983: 60 
Senate Committee: Foreign Relations, Subcommittees: 
European Affairs; Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Government Affairs Subcommittees: Energy and Nuclear 
Proliferation; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
Special Committee on Aging 
Democratic Policy Committee 
Biographical Information 
Born: July 18, 1921 in Cambridge, Ohio 
Education: New Concord High School (Ohio) 1939; 
Muskingum College, B.S. 
Career: President, Royal Crown International, 1967-1969; 
Vice President, Royal Crown, 1966-1968; NASA astro-
naut, 1959-1965 (first American to orbit Earth in 
spacecraft); U.S. Marine Corps-Colonel, combat pilot 
World War II and Korean War 
Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 
1980, Glenn defeated Republican James E. Betts. Glenn 
won sixty-nine percent of the vote. 
John Glenn announced his candidacy for President of the 
United States on April 21, 1983. 
If South Africa continues to block progress toward 
United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the 
dismantlement of apartheid at home, would your admin-
istration support the imposition of comprehensive United 
Nations sanctions against Soath Africa? If not, what 
measures would you be prepared to take? 
GLENN: The policy of "constructive engagement" 
which the administration has followed has been a mistake 
because it suggests we are condoning apartheid. That, to 
me, is wrong. We cannot appear in any way to condone 
apartheid. It also encourages South Africa to feel that 
they can delay almost indefinitely in negotiating a 
Namibia settlement, causing a serious deterioration in our 
relationship with other nations in Africa, particularly in 
southerr. Africa. That is the exact opposite of what our 
objectives should be in that part of the world. We have 
to keep pressing South Africa to release their strangle-
hold on Namibia. We have to give priority to improving 
relations with all the nations of Africa. Accomplishing 
that goal would require a different direction than the one 
the administration has been following. 
We should be trying to convince South Africa that im-
proving relations is in their hands, not ours. We should 
not be the ones that are bending over backward to im-
prove the relationship with South Africa. How do you 
put the sort of policy I advocate into practice? First, I 
would discourage new U.S. investment in South Africa 
and urge our allies to do the same. Second, the South 
African government should be on notice that their con-
tinued footdragging with regard to apartheid and the 
Namibia settlement could lead to sanctions at some time. 
Third, I would launch a very serious search for a Nami-
bian solution as a priority objective of my foreign policy. 
Fourth, I would enforce strict interpretation of U.S. 
Non-proliferation laws in the nuclear field. I was a prin-
cipal author of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
because of my concern about nuclear weaponry spreading 
to more and more countries around the world. Of course, 
South Africa has refused to abide by what we were hop-
ing to accomplish with that law by putting everything un-
der international atomic agency safeguards. 
Fifth, I would also, as a priority, develop an outreach 
program in sub-Saharan Africa, trying to develop our po-
litical dialogu~ with these countries by designing an ef-
fective long-term economic assistance program. It is im-
possible for us to do everything that those nations would 
like to have us do it the way of an economic program, 
but certainly it can be more coherent and a better pro-
gram than we have had to date. 
Finally, I would be more active in promoting black ad-
vancement, politically and economically, by supporting 
organizations working for peaceful change in South 
Africa. We can have a role to play in education, training 
and travel grants, labor unions, legal defense aid, and 
other public interest organizations. I am very interested, 
for example, in the black labor union movement in South 
Africa. A recent ABC television special indicated that 
these unions now have some 18,000 members. That is a 
very good step forward, which shows organizing ability 
and the development of a power source that can be a very 
major influence in the future. 
Unless we move our South Africa policy in some of 
these directions and do it soon, there is a real possibility 
of a violent and a bloody explosion in South Africa. It 
has been a long time coming. Black South Africans are 
not going to remain in the position that they are in and 
suffer as they have suffered for the indefinite future. So, 
I hope that whatever influence we can have there we can 
mold into a more position direction than it now appears 
to be heading. 
The United States is the only major Western power that 
does not recognize Angola. Would your administration 
normalize relations with Angola? 
GLENN: As a general principle of foreign policy, I favor 
maintaining contact with other nations, whether we agree 
with them on everything or not. When we in effect cut 
communications and cut all relationships-unless it is a 
nation that really provokes us to a great degree-then we 
make a mistake. We should maintain some kind of con-
tact and some kind of dialogue. That certainly would be 
the case with Angola. Normalizing relations with Angola 
is probably long overdue. We will continue to have our 
disagreements because I certainly don't condone the in-
volvement of Cubans in that country. But looking at the 
situation almost solely in terms of an East-West confron-
tation as the current administration does is not the way 
to achieve a peaceful resolution to the situation. 
Recognition of Angola is a step also in freeing Namibia 
of South African domination and removing the Cubans 
from Angola. The Angolans have given assurances that 
the Cubans would be withdrawn under these conditions. 
Perhaps, we should accept these assurances and be the 
ones to take the first step and agree to recognize Angola. 
That is a step I would be willing to take. We would have 
a number of options open if the Angolans did not ask 
the Cubans to leave or if the Cubans refused their request. 
Whatever occurred after recognition, we certainly would 
be in no worse position than we are now. And there al-
ways is the chance that the Angolans would ask the Cu-
bans to leave and that the Cubans would comply. This 
certainly would remove any reasons that the South Afri-
cans would have for further delaying the Namibian set-
tlement. 
Would your administration seek a normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you 
propose? 
GLENN: Cuba is a special problem. Not only is it only 
ninety miles from our shores, but I also cannot condone 
Cuban troops meddling around on behalf of the Soviets 
all over the world. In Central America-EI Salvador par-
ticularly-the flow of arms is in part coming from Cuba; 
and that certainly is not in the best interests of the United 
States. I am very concerned about Cuba's close ties with 
the Soviets, including even the presence of Soviet troops-
which we monitor on a regular basis-on the island itself. 
Despite my concerns about Cuba, I do not like this ad-
ministration's dangerous and loose talk of going to the 
source. Early in this administration, they even talked 
about blockading Cuba. I cannot think of anything that 
would be more counterproductive. When we talk about 
blockading Cuba, we should be very careful as to not 
create a situation in which the Soviets would call our 
bluff. Such an approach only makes matters worse. 
On the other hand, to say that the Cubans are the 
source of all the problems in Central and South America 
is also ridiculous. If they were not involved, there still 
would be major problems in Central and South America. 
Despite our differences with the Cuban government, 
I once again feel that we should be carrying on a dialogue. 
I do not like to see confrontations grow and grow. Al-
though I do not favor recognition at this time, we can 
have some sort of dialogue back and forth even with na-
tions with whom we disagree. 
My views would be very similar to those of the Carter 
administration. We should encourage Cuba, perhaps 
through our discussions with them, to stop some of this 
meddling that they do on behalf of the Soviets. I certainly 
cannot condone what they have done, but if we expect 
to have some sort of peaceful resolution and some sort 
of resumption of normal ties some time in the indefinite 
future, then we have to keep some form of dialogue go-
ing with them. 
How would your administration's policies toward Gre-
nada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan 
administration? 
GLENN: We obviously have very serious differences 
with Nicaragua. Their revolution has turned out to be 
far more totalitarian in nature ,and much more restric-
tive than many first thought. At the same time they have 
expanded their military capability dramatically. We 
should be greatly concerned by the support for and the 
pass through of arms to guerillas in El Salvador. 
The administration has sought to isolate Nicaragua and 
to support covertly military forces operating in Nicara-
gua. I am not sympathetic with the direction that the 
Sandinista government has taken, and I am opposed to 
their arming and supporting guerillas in El Salvador. But 
I am also opposed to arming right wing guerillas that we 
do not have control over or cannot guarantee their be-
havior. A group like that, once armed, may change their 
objectives. 
Honduras has had an interest in making certain that 
arms do not flow through it to El Salvador. Perhaps, 
rather than our getting directly involved with groups that 
might or might not be under our control, we might be 
well advised to give greater support to Honduras. It is 
possible that they can handle this situation better than 
we can with our attempts to arm anti-Sandinista guerillas. 
I also believe a lessening of tensions in the region is 
desirable. The U.S., for example, should be more recep-
tive to regional peace initiatives of other key nations in-
the region. Moreover, we should not close the door to 
communications with Nicaragua. While we should con-
tinue to insist on a cessation of arms and supplies to 
Salvadoran guerillas, we should consider as a quid pro 
quo the cessation of U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista 
paramilitary forces and assurances that we have no 
designs on Nicaraguan territorial integrity. 
Despite the seriously deteriorated state of our relations, 
I do not believe we should abandon the field to the 
Cubans. We may be totally unsuccessful in reaching any 
acceptable resolution of outstanding differences with the 
Sandinistas, but it should not be for lack of trying. 
Grenada also bothers me because of the pattern of ex-
panded military activity on the island-not just the air-
port, but other activity as well . It is not clear to me what 
is happening there and in Suriname. Both nations' rela-
tions with Cuba and Cuban intentions in the eastern part 
of the Caribbean are not clear as yet, but they certainly 
raise some troubling questions . They may both be part 
of possible Cuban expansion into the region. As far as 
Grenada is concerned, we will have to wait and see. I do 
not like, however, the possibility of another island being 
taken over and placed under almost direct Cuban super-
vison or intervention, which appears to be what has hap-
pened there. The situation is a little less clear in Suriname. 
Would your administration support increasing levels of 
development assistance to Africa? 
GLENN: Africa has tremendous problems of poverty, 
poor health conditions, and illiteracy. Obviously, any-
thing that we can do to reduce these problems should be 
done. We have a humanitarian, economic, and strategic 
stake in the development of the Third World. 
Economically, we are in an increasingly interdependent 
world; and we play a very major role in the world econ-
omy. Our commercial links to the Third World have been 
expanding tremendously. We can no longer live in isola-
tion in America whether we want to or not. Our increas-
ing trade with the Third World is very, very important. 
It is also a big market for our exports. So when there is 
instability, civil strife, war, or revolution in the develop-
ing world, it certainly runs contrary to U.S. economic 
and security interests. 
In contrast to the present administration, I believe that 
political injustice and economic deprivation are the root 
of most of the unrest across Africa and the rest of the 
developing world today. When that is the case, the Soviets 
are likely to move in and maximize these difficulties for 
their own purposes. Sometimes they have succeeded, 
sometimes they have not. So it is in our interests to give 
as much as we can in humanitarian and economic aid . 
It is the right thing to do, and it also protects our strate-
gic interests in that part of the world. 
The resources that we put into foreign development as-
sistance have been falling as a percentage of Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP) in recent years. I am not particular-
ly proud of that. Of the industrialized nations of the 
world, we are now in thirteenth place in terms of the 
percentage of GNP that we give to these purposes. Mean-
while, if African nations are to be able to work their way 
up the ladder a little bit, their development needs remain 
very critical. 
Despite these trends, this administration has sought to 
shift the relative mix of our scarce resources away from 
economic aid and more toward military aid. A higher per-
centage of U.S. aid is going to military aid to the detri-
ment of true development assistance. I would like to see 
a reversal of that trend. I supported an amendment to 
shift $92 million out of FY 1984 foreign aid funds from 
military aid to genuine development assistance accounts. 
We should also make use of the people we have. In 
past hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have 
made a point of questioning our A.I.D. and State Depart-
ment staffs concerning better utilizing the people of this 
country that have cultural ties to the developing world. 
We have a rich diversity of people in this country that 
we could make better use of in our foreign policymak-
ing. It seems to me that our goal should be policies that 
help people most in the Third World. 
What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? 
In what specific ways would your administration modify 
it? 
GLENN: I supported the thrust of the administration's 
C.B.I. proposal. The political stability in the Caribbean, 
as in other regions of the world, is very much a question 
of economic stability. I supported the $350 million in ad-
ditional economic aid that was part of the C.B.I. pro-
posal. I doubt, however, that a one-shot proposal, such 
as the C.B.I. plan, is effective in the long-run. We need 
a longer-range, on-going program so that we can have 
a lasting impact. I, therefore, supported Senator Dodd's 
proposal to change the nature of C.B.l.aid, making it a 
permanent economic development facility and putting it 
under the auspices of an institution like the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank. The banks in their loan programs 
and in the projects that they have supported take a very 
tough, hard-nosed view. They are trying to insure long-
term development for the people of the region. I sup-
ported Senator Dodd's proposal because I think our aid 
could be more effectively developed and administered by 
the regional banking institutions. Then we would be in 
a better position to ask for contributions from other 
donor countries who would be more willing to cooperate. 
I amended the C.B.I. aid legislation to express a sense 
of the Senate that in order to reinforce the economic de-
velopment goals that we have embraced in the C.B.I. we 
must negotiate replenishment of and increase the re-
sources of the Inter-American Development Bank's fund 
for special operations, which was the principle source for 
concessional lending for some of the same Caribbean Ba-
sin countries. 
However, there are some problems with the C.B.I. con-
cept in terms of the duty-free treatment of Caribbean 
Basin goods. We need to look at that very carefully and 
to fully assess the trade benefits for the Caribbean na-
tions as well as the impact on U.S. jobs and the industries 
which are going to be hit the hardest. We need to make 
that kind of assessment and to include strong protections 
against pass-through industries that might invest not for 
the development of those countries, but as a means to 
gain access to the U.S. market through a pass-through 
operation. We must institute some form of protection 
against that type of operation. 
What position would your administration take on African 
regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Sahara? 
GLENN: We cannot dictate what is going to happen in 
those areas . When regional conflicts like the Horn or the 
Western Sahara occur, we ought to push as hard as we 
possibly can for peaceful resolution. We ought to be the 
catalyst that gets the parties together and gets discussions 
going that could lead to peace. The model for that is the 
Camp David talks which set the conditions for peaceful 
discussions. While I am not proposing a Camp David pro-
posal for every conflict around the world, we want to be 
the peacemaker in these situations . We want to be the 
one that tries to suggest everything possible, short of U.S. 
direct intervention; and we want to make certain that 
peace can be negotiated if at all possible. 
In the cases of both the Horn and the Western Sahara, 
perhaps we should operate in conjunction with the 
O.A.U. and get them to take a more active part in medi-
ating and seeking a negotiated settlement. When we put 
weapons into these areas, we should make certain that 
they are defensive weapons . I am not arguing that we 
should not give weapons to those nations that have been 
our friends, but we should not arm a country for offen-
sive warfare against its neighbor in either the Horn or 
the Western Sahara. 
What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee 
laws and practice would your administration implement? 
What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other 
black refugees? 
GLENN: The Senate has just been going through a 
review of immigration policy for the first time in more 
than twenty years. We have had tremendous changes in-
the openness of our borders, notably in the southwest-a 
significant developent which has impacted directly on 
U.S. immigration policy. Each year we have not only 
thousands, but hundreds of thousands of illegal im-
migrants come into our country-understandably to es-
cape poverty, injustice, human rights violations, and civil 
strife in their countries. We have had a particularly heavy 
burden placed on us because we have been the nation to 
which most people would prefer to come. So, our im-
migration laws have needed a very thorough going over. 
I support in general the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration 
Reform Bill. It strikes a reasonable balance between the 
problems of asylum and tenure for those who have been 
in our country for a period of time-more specifically, 
for those who have been here since 1972, including a sig-
nificant number of Haitians who have tried to or have 
entered the United States seeking political asylum. If 
refugees came to this country fearing persecution based 
on race, religion, or nationality, or because there is a 
danger to them if they were forced to return, obviously 
we have to fulfill this obligation or asylum without ref-
erence to race or any nationality concerns. 
The opportunity for judicial review is an important 
safeguard in this right to asylum, and it would not be 
overly burdensome to our judicial system. I supported 
last year and will support this year an amendment to the 
Immigration Reform Bill (Simpson-Mazzoli) which re-
tains the current right of judicial review of asylum cases. 
I have talked with Charlie Smith, who was the Deputy 
Director of the N.A.A.C.P. and its task force on refugee 
problems in Florida, now a member of my staff, about 
the problems facing the Haitians and other refugees. This 
has reinforced my view that, as a matter of principle, the 
policy of detaining asylum applicants is appalling, has 
not been practiced evenly, and has been carried out in 
a discriminatory manner. Recently, the Appellate Court 
upheld the finding that Haitians are treated in a 
discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the question has been 
taken out of the policy arena; and that is good. It is a 
development I strongly endorse. □ 
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If South Africa continues to block progress toward U .N. 
supervised elections in Namibia, and the dismantlement 
of apartheid at home, would your administration sup-
port the imposition of comprehensive United Nations 
sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures 
would you be prepared to take? 
HART: A fundamental goal of U.S. policy towards 
South Africa must be support for the human rights and 
civil liberties of all the people of South Africa. Apartheid 
is a spiritually corrosive and politically destructive system 
which can only lead to the ultimately destruction of the 
South African nation. That is not in our interests no mat-
ter how one measures it. A peaceful, politically settled 
South Africa will, in the long-run, contribute more to the 
protection of U.S. national and strategic interests in 
Africa than would short-term concessions by the United 
States to the apartheid regime in the name of political 
expediency. 
Sanctions can be useful if they are applied judiciously 
and thoughtfully. To be effective, they must be coor-
dinated with other concerned states and particularly with 
those people we want to help in South Africa. We should 
not support sanctions on South Africa that are opposed 
by the victims of apartheid. Even if other nations do not 
support sanctions, we can give a clear signal to the gov-
ernment of South Africa that we will not help rescue it 
from the consequences of its apartheid policies. 
Giving assistance to grassroots black enterprises, 
organizations and projects such as schools, clinics, and 
businesses, can demonstrate our moral as well as finan-
cial backing for the victims of apartheid. It can be done 
quietly or publicly. But it must be done in such a man-
ner that the government of South Africa and , more im-
portantly, black South Africans in need, know that we 
are helping. But by focusing our attention on the as-
sistance, rather than on the attention we can generate for 
ourselves, we will project an even more important mes-
sage: the object of our policy is to help those in need, 
not self-aggrandizement. 
In our dealings with the South African government, 
we should absolutely forego any U.S. government finan-
cial aid, loans, trade, or support for South Africa's 
nuclear industry. We should not provide any aid, in-
cluding technology, which is to be used for military or 
police suppression of the South African population. The 
recent approval by the Reagan administration of the sale 
of electric cattle prods to the South African police is an 
example of the inexcusable and immoral support for 
repression which must be stopped. 
Finally, we should put into effect legislation similar to 
that proposed by Congressman Solarz of New York re-
quiring that all U.S. firms operating in South Africa 
engage in fair employment and wage practices. 
The threat of U.S. sanctions has kept South Africa 
bargaining with the Contact Group of nations over the 
procedures for free election and the establishment of self-
government in Namibia. The policy outlined above would 
go well with efforts to convince the government of South 
Africa of our seriousness in supporting a free Namibia, 
just as it would convey clearly our rejection of the apart-
heid system. 
The U.S. is the only major Western power that does not 
recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize 
relations with Angola? If not, why not? 
HART: Current U.S. relations with Angola reflect an ap-
parent Reagan administration decision to reinforce rela-
tions with South Africa at the expense of other African 
nations. The Reagan policy, linking South African 
withdrawal from Namibia to the Cuban withdrawal from 
Angola, was ostensibly directed at improving chances for 
a settlement in 1982. Instead, confrontation between 
South Africa and Angola has increased, and Pretoria has 
interpreted the support of the Reagan administration as 
giving it carte blanche to pu~h for even greater regional 
hegemony. It is time to reconsider the linkage question 
in terms of current realities . 
Recognition of a foreign government does not in itself 
mean we condone its behavior or support its policies. 
Recognition means we agree that a government has an 
international legal status and represents the legal and 
political authority in a country. Normalized relations be-
tween the United States and Angola could be mutually 
advantageous. It would show that U.S. willingness to deal 
with African nations, particularly black African nations, 
on the basis of individual legitimacy and a commitment 
to international human rights as well as economic in-
terests , is not permanently distorted by our ties to South 
Africa. 
Even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, 
such U.S. companies as Gulf Oil, Boeing Aircraft, Cities 
Services, and Chase Manhattan Bank have garnered a 
trade partnership with Angola amounting to several hun-
dreds of millions of dollars annually. Not until the United 
States abandons its hostility toward the MPLA regime, 
however, is Washington likely to establish a constructive 
dialogue with Luanda on the removal of Cuban soldiers 
in Angola. Furthermore, the MPLA government will con-
tinue to resist expelling the Cubans as long as its security 
is imperiled by South African attacks. 
Would your administration seek a normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you 
prefer? 
HART: I do not in any way condone the Castro govern-
ment's policies. Cuba has no business sending armies to 
Africa or meddling in the affairs of its Central American 
and Caribbean neighbors. Castro's belligerent attitude 
towards the United States and his attempt to use our 
country as a scapegoat for the failure of communism to 
solve Cuba's economic and social woes is unjustified and 
offensive. 
That said, Cuba is less than 100 miles off our coast. 
And whether we approve of its behavior or not-and I 
do not-we cannot ignore Cuba's presence or its poten-
tial for creating mischief in the Caribbean area. 
We should, for the time being, maintain contacts 
through the U.S. Interest Section in Havana. It can be 
in our mutual interest to expand and develop relations. 
The extent to which that will be possible will depend a 
great deal on the attitude of the Castro government. For 
our part, we are not going to resolve our conflicts with 
Cuba overnight. 
Hopefully, over the longer term, our relations with 
Cuba will improve. This will require positive action by 
both sides. The United States should be prepared to in-
itiate and respond to positive overtures to set that action 
in motion. 
How would your administration's policies toward Gre-
nada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan 
administration? 
HART: My policies toward Central America and the 
Caribbean would differ dramatically from those of the 
current administration. First, I would set the priorities 
differently. Our first goal should be to support the growth 
of democratic political and social institutions in the 
region. This means putting pressure on the left and the 
right to curb abuses of power and to encourage both sides 
to accept the consequences of a genuine democracy. 
The establishment of Marxist regimes in Nicaragua or 
EI Salvador is not in our interest. I am distressed by the 
continuing drift toward repression in Nicaragua. The San-
dinista government has closed the opposition press, 
postponed elections, and purged its more democratic 
members from key posts in the government. Nicaragua 
continues to interfere in the Salvadoran civil war. That 
must stop. 
At the same time, we cannot forget the excesses of the 
right wing Somoza government that pushed Nicaragua 
into revolt. We are in danger of making the same mistake 
in El Salvador. The Reagan administration has been quick 
to point to Nicaragua and is correct in saying the rebels 
in El Salvador could be even worse. But in the name of 
anti-communism, this administration has been prepared 
to accept, ignore, and at times even excuse the anti-
democratic, repressive, and even terroristic practices of 
the Salvadoran right. 
U.S. policy should be designed to bring the disputing 
parties together, rather than driving them apart. Harsh 
rhetoric and a commitment to a military solution is not 
likely to bring peace to the region any time soon. We can-
not solve Central America's problems if we refuse to talk 
to the parties involved and if we engage in covert efforts 
to subvert and overthrow one of the parties in the dispute. 
We should be secure enough in our own position, and 
our own power, that we do not feel threatened by the 
prospect of discussions with the Sandinista government. 
If we want to exert a positive influence on its actions, 
however, we must pursue a course of correct, no-nonsense 
diplomatic contact. The Reagan administration's con-
frontational approach, involving support for the armed 
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, restriction of 
trade and diplomatic contact, and the use of harsh 
rhetoric can only exacerbate relations. The Reagan policy 
is likely to drive the Nicaraguans even further into the 
Cuban/ 
Soviet orbit. It also gives a clear and unmistakable signal 
to every other nation in the region that we are unwilling 
to rely on the rule of law and the normal international 
diplomatic processes to resolve our disputes. The Reagan 
policy suggests that we look first to the use of military 
force rather than keeping it as a last resort. 
The Reagan administration has reacted as if America's 
national security is threatened by Grenada, a nation which 
is smaller than Fairfax County, Virginia. If we want to 
keep Grenada out of the Soviet orbit we should adopt 
policies designed to encourage better relations with 
democracies rather than pursuing a course of action 
which pushes Grenada towards Moscow by way of 
Havana. 
Would your administration support increasing levels of 
development assistance to Africa? 
HART: In the past, the United States has provided a 
great deal in foreign aid to Africa and other parts of the 
developing world. Unfortunately, this has often been of-
fered only when the recipient country has been in the 
throes of civil war or is the victim of a perceived com-
munist threat or has experienced a natural disaster . 
My administration will seek to correct this problem by 
offering foreign assistance on a consistent long-term 
basis-not only when crises arise. Second, I will insist that 
economic aid be directed to the most impoverished mem-
bers of the society and focus less on military or security 
assistance. 
The level of aid to Africa will obviously depend on the 
state of the U.S. economy and our assessment of the 
specific problems confronted by African nations. Africa 
is a continent endowed with tremendous resources and 
has great economic potential. An American aid policy in-
corporating training, economic assistance, and the in-
troduction of appropriate technology, directed toward the 
economic development of Africa will help the African 
people as well as the United States. 
What is your position on the Caribbean Basin initiative? 
In what specific ways would your administration modify 
it? 
HART: U.S. aid programs should be designed to meet 
the needs of the people in countries and regions where 
they are being implemented. The President's Caribbean 
Basin Initiative does not do that satisfactorily. It confuses 
the Caribbean, which has one set of economic problems, 
with Central America, which has a very different set of 
economic and political problems. To compound the prob-
lem, the Reagan administration has used the purported 
vehicle of the C.B.I. to push large amounts of military 
aid-primarily intended for Central America-through 
Congress. Thus, the C.B.I., which is billed in public as 
a major economic program for the Caribbean, turns out 
to be largely military aid for Central America. 
My first step would be, therefore, to design an 
economic and commercial program specifically for the 
Caribbean, which would take into account the following 
points: 
-our special responsibilities for and need to be sen-
sitive to the economies of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands; 
-the similarity of many of the economies in the region, 
which discourages trade among the nations of the Carib-
bean and requires a search for markets outside the region; 
-the need for the program to be developed jointly with 
the leaders of the governments, industry, and commerce 
in the region to ensure that the goals we are furthering 
have the support of those sections; and 
-our own domestic concerns. 
Our economy is big enough to provide some additional 
markets for Caribbean goods. Many of the proposals in 
the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative-the trade and 
investment incentives in particular-could have a positive 
effect for the Caribbean. In implementing a Caribbean 
Trade and investment policy, however, special care needs 
to be taken to protect the rights of workers in the Carib-
bean and in the United States. The programs must be 
designed to stimulate real growth in the Caribbean and 
not to turn small Caribbean economies into transmission 
points for exports manufactured outside the region. 
In addition to encouraging these portions of the CBI, 
the United States should work with Caribbean nations 
to develop their trade potential with other parts of the 
world to break economic and commercial dependence on 
the U.S. market. Breaking that sense of dependence 
would not only be economically healthy for our Carib-
bean neighbors, but psychologically and politically 
healthy as well. Finally, we should encourage continued 
economic assistance through multilateral lending institu-
tions and development programs. Our primary concern 
should be to assist them to establish a sense of economic 
and political autonomy, self-respect and independence. 
What position would your administration take on African 
regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Sahara? 
HART: Encouraging the polarization of the crisis by 
assuming that one side is "right" or "wrong," or jump-
ing to the conclusion that the hand of Moscow had stirred 
up every case of civil and social unrest is counterproduc-
tive. Regional conflicts are generally caused by deep-
seated, complicated regional problems. While the Soviet 
Union and its allies may take advantage of the situation 
to further their goals, they are seldom the cause of the 
problem. Similarly, it is almost never the case that the 
fault for regional disputes lies entirely with one side or 
the other. 
Mediation by regional organizations, interested but im-
partial neighbors, or even outside nations acceptable to 
the parties in the dispute should be supported whenever 
possible. 
When appropriate, the U.S. should be prepared to 
entertain a request for the use of its good offices in bring-
ing about a peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. U.S. 
diplomacy should assist in such an effort and not take 
sides in the dispute or in any other way act to undercut 
the efforts of local and regional organizations. 
What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee 
laws and practice would your administration implement? 
What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other 
black refugees? 
HART: The United States has a historic tradition of ac-
cepting those people who have been driven from their 
homes by oppressive governments or who have been the 
object of persecution. Our country has demonstrated 
many times over that those who have been rejected by 
other nations can grow in freedom and contribute to the 
establishment of a healthy, diverse, and vibrant society. 
Sadly, in the past few years, American willingness to 
accept refugees from other lands has declined. Economic 
conditions have played a role, to be sure. It is harder to 
accommodate large numbers of immigrants when jobs 
are scarce. Americans have become less willing in recent 
years to accept groups of refugees and asylum seekers 
who are different-different in race, in tradition, in creed. 
I am firmly committed to coordinated foreign and 
refugee politics. My article, "Immigrants and the New 
Bill,'' which appeared in the August 24, 1982, New York 
Times was written to stimulate thought and to draw at-
tention to the need for consensus in this most important 
area. 
Three very important steps must be taken if the U.S. 
is to address successfully and fairly the problem posed 
by the large numbers of people coming to our shores seek-
ing asylum and refuge. First, we must ensure that our 
domestic policies provide equal economic opportunity to 
everyone. Second, our foreign policy, especially our 
economic and assistance policies, must be aimed at resolv-
ing those social and economic ills which compel people 
to abandon the land of their birth. Finally, we must 
guarantee the consistent application of the Refugee Act 
of 1980, which provides for uniform procedures for deter-
mining individual cases of asylum. 
The case of the Haitian refugees is particularly graphic. 
Although they cannot possibly think they have entered 
the "golden door" of economic and social opportunity, 
they continue to come. Life in the United States, either 
as illegals or in refugee camps, is hard . But it is obvious-
ly preferable to a life where social and economic oppor-
tunity are systematically denied. Until Congress and the 
American people face this fact, it will be difficult to con-
trol the flow of immigrants . Specifically, we need to 
recognize that our tacit support of repressive regimes like 
that of Duvalier in Haiti will be paid for in an influx of 
"boat people." 
Unless we do our part to assist in worldwide efforts 
to aid displaced and oppressed peoples, we will not be 
in a position to argue that other states in Africa or 
elsewhere should combat the root causes of human 
suffering. 
We should be clear about one last thing. We cannot, 
in the long-run, accept all of the world's poor and op-
pressed. The political and economic strains on our coun-
try would be too great. To the extent that we decide, 
however, that we must set limits on how many oppressed 
and persecuted people we are able to accept within our 
borders, we must accept the moral consequences of our 
act and be prepared to extend a helping economic hand 
to those who suffer wherever they may be found. □ 
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If South Africa continues to block progress toward 
United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the 
dismantlement of apartheid at home, would your admin-
istration support the imposition of comprehensive United 
Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what 
measures would you be prepared to take? 
HOLLINGS: Yes, at this point I would support such 
sanctions. Unfortunately, the policy of "constructive en-
gagement" has not worked. Recent developments in 
Namibia make it clear that our approach with South Afri-
ca has not led to the desired result. Economic sanctions 
are not a desirable policy of first choice. The present sit-
uation, however, leaves us with few alternatives. 
The United States is the only major Western power that 
does not recognize Angola. Would your administration 
normalize relations with Angola? If not, why not? 
HOLLINGS: Although I look forward to the normaliza-
tion of relations at the soonest possible opportunity, I 
oppose the normalization so long as Cuban troops remain 
in Angola. 
Would your administration seek a normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you 
propose? 
HOLLINGS: For there to be a meaningful change in our 
relations with Cuba, there would have to be a clear dem-
onstration of good faith from Cuba. Its conduct in Afri-
ca, in Central America, and in other trouble spots is what 
prevents progress toward normal relations. I would wel-
come a demonstration of changed attitude. 
How would your administration's policies toward 
Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan 
administration? 
HOLLINGS: I oppose the "covert" operation in 
Nicaragua. It is not covert and does not make sense. 
Throughout Latin America, we have ignored problems 
of long standing and found ourselves, in the absence of 
any sensible and consistent policy, reacting with strategies 
of last resort. Our emphasis should be on strategies that 
build solid relationships with our neighbors and prevent 
crises by focusing on productive social and economic pol-
icies . 
As for Grenada, it seems that after years of complacen-
cy and interest in little more than that island's nutmeg, 
we have suddenly discovered its strategic importance. This 
is another example of our on-again, off-again, stop-and-
go Latin American policy. We neglect the area until a 
crisis develops, and then we find we have no foundation 
to build on. 
Would your administration support increasing levels of 
development assistance to Africa? 
HOLLINGS: I support development assistance on a 
selective basis, targeted at clearly identified needs and 
goals. In the past, we have allocated money with little 
regard for effective use. Assistance on the basis of a blank 
check is wasteful and we cannot afford it. As for the ap-
propriate level of assistance, that should be established 
by an assessment of need. I would not want to predeter-
mine the answer to such a review at this point. 
What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? 
In what specific ways would your administration modify 
it? 
HOLLINGS: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, for which 
I voted, is a step in the right direction. However, it is not 
sufficient and cannot substitute for a thoughtful and con-
sistent policy supporting economic development in all of 
Latin America. We need to focus on the development of 
solid, viable infrastructure, establish long-term objectives, 
and approach them with enough flexibility to respond to 
the diverse conditions prevailing in the region. 
What position would your administration take on African 
regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Sahara? 
HOLLINGS: I am in favor of regional solutions to 
regional problems, to whatever extent possible. We, as 
a nation, bear an important responsibility in providing 
leadership in the foreign policy area. However, we can-
not resolve all crises, and certainly not unilaterally. There 
are some lessons to be learned from the Central American 
situation. It is in our own self-interest to encourage more 
active involvement on the part of the troubled area's 
neutral neighbors and regional organizations in helping 
resolve complex regional problems. 
What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee 
laws and practice would your administration implement? 
What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other 
black refugees? 
HOLLINGS: I supported the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, 
which the Senate approved during the last Congress and 
again this year. The House has not yet approved it. If 
passed, this law will not please everybody, but there is 
no ideal solution, and we need to proceed with a reason-
ably sensible approach. That means rectifying the status 
of the three to six million illegal immigrants living in this 
country. Their current status denies them basic human 
rights, subjects them to exploitation, and creates an un-
derclass which does not share in our national values . 
Equally important, we must gain effective control of our 
borders. Our immigration policy must be humane. But 
it must be based on a determination to assert our sover-
eignty. The proper way to deal with the feelings of eco-
nomic despair in the Third World is to promote economic 
development there, not to bring those populations here. 
As for sanctions against employers, these will have to 
be monitored as they are implemented to make sure they 
do not have an adverse and discriminatory effect. 
As for Haitian refugees, they represent a special prob-
lem for us, much as do refugees from El Salvador. There 
are both economic emigres and political refugees leaving 
Haiti. We cannot accept all the economic emigres who 
wish to come here . But we feel a certain responsibility 
to political refugees. Communist dictatorships are not 
alone in practicing political persecution and current def-
initions of political refugee status may not fit reality . We 
need to examine our policies in this area to determine 
what would be the most effective and thoughtful way to 
proceed. D 
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If South Africa continues to block progress toward 
United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the 
dismantlement of apartheid at home, would your admin-
istration support the imposition of comprehensive United 
Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what 
measures would you be prepared to take? 
MONDALE: Two years after the Reagan administration 
reversed our policies in southern Africa, their policy has 
produced few positive results. Rather than directly con-
fronting the difficulties South Africa poses for American 
interests in southern Africa, they instituted "construc-
tive engagement." They proposed to turn South Africa 
around by offering a series of unilateral concessions. It 
is hardly surprising that the United States has gotten noth-
ing in return. 
When I met with former Prime Minister Vorster in Vi-
enna in 1977, I made it clear to him that South Africa 
must allow all its people to share fully in the political life 
and future of the country. Apartheid is antithetical to our 
most basic values. Tolerating or ignoring it is not an ac-
ceptable American policy. 
As President, I would press South Africa for mean-
ingful action. I would make certain the South Africans 
understood that if they did not make progress on Namibia 
and apartheid, we would be prepared to use sanctions in 
cooperation with other nations. We should also be pre-
pared to employ a range of unilateral measures, such as 
restrictions in the areas of exports, nuclear materials, and 
air traffic. 
Finally, as President I would move to restore the trust 
that the Carter-Mondale administration had been able to 
create between the United States and black Africa. Work-
ing together, we were able to bring about majority rule 
in Zimbabwe and real movement toward independence 
for Namibia. The distance the Reagan administration has 
put between itself and black Africa has encouraged South 
Africa to assume that we will no longer pressure them 
relentlessly to change. "Constructive engagement" has 
merely emboldened South Africa to delay leaving Nami-
bia and to destabilize neighboring Mozambique, Angola, 
and Zimbabwe. 
By making it clear that we stand with black Africa 
against these strategies, we can greatly increase South 
Africa's incentive to change course. 
The United States is the only major Western power that 
does not recognize Angola. Would your administration 
normalize relations with Angola? 
MONDALE: Angola presents an important opportuni-
ty for the United States. Our ability to work with Angolan 
leaders has become central to reaching a satisfactory 
agreement over Namibia. In my judgment, our current 
policy is wrong. 
It is highly desirable to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban 
combat troops from Angola, but I do not believe that 
linking a settlement in Namibia to this withdrawal is an 
effective way of achieving either goal. Rather, a free and 
independent Namibia would probably be the most power-
ful argument against the continued presence of Cuban 
troops. The Reagan administration's insistence that with-
drawal of Cuban troops precede South African conces-
sions on Namibia virtually guarantees that the Cubans 
will remain indefinitely. 
We should be willing to sit down and work out an ac-
ceptable basis for relations with Angola. Our failure to 
do this has certainly hurt us, as the current Namibia stale-
mate demonstrates. And refusing to talk with the Angol-
ans makes little sense in light of the fact that all of our 
allies and friends have normal relations with them. We 
should at least try to communicate with all other nations. 
A Mondale administration would begin that process with 
Angola. 
Would your administration seek a normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would your 
propose? 
MONDALE: President Reagan came into office deter-
mined to solve the problems of Central America by go-
ing to the "source"-Cuba. Since then, the problems of 
Central America have grown worse, and by the State 
Department's own estimate, Cuba has received more arms 
shipments from the Soviet Union that in any previous 
time since the Cuban missile crisis. 
The Reagan administration has refused to talk to Cuba. 
We have very serious problems and very important ob-
jectives-none of which can be accomplished without 
talking. We have security objectives in stopping Cuban 
subversion and intervention and Cuban support for Sovi-
et military objectives abroad. We have interests-which 
this administration has apparently forgotten-in human 
rights. We have economic and other concerns. All these 
problems will be difficult to resolve, but the minimal first 
step is to start talking. 
How would your administration's policies toward Gre-
nada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan ad-
ministration? 
MONDALE: In March of 1981, former Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig insisted that Nicaragua had not 
been "lost" to the Communists and that there were still 
"a number of very important democratic elements seek-
ing change in Nicaragua." It is harder to make such a 
statement today. By pursuing a confrontational policy 
toward Nicaragua, the Reagan administration has unwit-
tingly strengthened the hands of the most extreme Marx-
ist-Leninists and opened the way to the repression of al-
most all moderate groups in Nicaragua. The Reagan ad-
ministration's strategy has hurt our democratic friends 
in Nicaragua, and it has helped our enemies by giving 
them an excuse for their own failures and a propaganda 
justification for their repression. 
The problems of the region are not just the product 
of outside intervention, as the administration contends, 
nor should we attempt to solve them through American 
military intervention. These problems are the result of 
generations of militarism, poverty, and injustice, which 
the United States has not always been quick enough to 
oppose. We have ignored these problems for too long, 
and then have responded inappropriately to the crises that 
inevitably have arisen. 
I strongly support the efforts of Latin American de-
mocracies in the Cantadora group to bring peace to the 
troubled region of Central America through negotiations. 
And I would favor an important assistance program to 
help these countries to recover and make the kind of eco-
nomic progress of which they are capable. 
In the case of Grenada, the Reagan administration has 
lost any and all sense of proportion. Grenada is a tiny 
island of 100,000 people-smaller in size and population 
than most towns in the U.S. The Reagan administration's 
belligerent rhetoric has not only made the U.S. look lu-
dicrous; it has made the Grenadan government seem 
heroic, and it has antagonized our friends in the region. 
The departure from the democratic traditions of the 
eastern Caribbean by the Bishop regime is a serious cause 
for concern to Grenada's neighbors-all of whom remain 
democratic-and to the U.S., but it does not represent 
a global threat to the U.S. Without in the least relaxing 
our support for civil liberties and democratic elections, 
we should explore possibilities for improving relations 
with this small island nation. 
TransAfrica ought to be commended for trying to fa-
cilitate a dialogue with the Bishop regime. 
Our best chance of defeating communism in the Carib-
bean and in Central America is to ally ourselves with 
those who share our democratic values . That means op-
posing the extremism of the right as well as the left. And 
it means doing everything we can to strengthen and assist 
the forces of democracy. When peasants ask for land, 
when journalists ask for free speech, when politicians ask 
for the right to peacefully organize, when the victims of 
torture ask for justice-the United States must be at their 
side. A Mondale administration would ensure that U.S. 
policy reflects these concerns. 
Would your administration support increasing levels of 
development assistance to Africa? 
MONDALE: A solid relationship with the nations of 
Africa is important to us . To achieve it, we must play 
a substantial role in fostering Africa' s economic develop-
ment. During the Carter-Mondale administration, U.S. 
economic and technical assistance to Africa more than 
doubled, from $300 million to well over $700 million. The 
Reagan administration , on the other hand, has increased 
military assistance while reducing vital development aid. 
Among the important consequences of this trend has been 
a sharp reduction in the funds available to support the 
highly effective programs of American voluntary agen-
cies in the developing world. 
This policy is terribly shortsighted. By now we should 
have learned that instability throughout the world thrives 
on hunger and grinding poverty. Of the world's thirty 
poorest countries , twenty are in Africa. 
We must respond to Africa's economic problems, not 
only to promote human decency, but also from an en-
lightened concern for our own long-term interests. If we 
want an Africa capable of buying American cars or grain, 
if we want an Africa that sees us as a partner and en-
dorses our values and objectives, we must increase our 
contribution to Africa's development. We must under-
take this foreign assistance, not as a dole, but as an in-
vestment in the future . Aid must go to the poorest and 
neediest regions of the continent, not just to those coun-
tries defined as strategically important to the United 
States. 
Currently inflated levels of military aid tend to desta-
bilize Africa by escalating the East-West conflict. 
Development assistance, coupled with prudent diplo-
macy, will be much more effective in fostering peace and 
security on the continent. 
What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? 
In what specific ways would your administration modify 
it? 
MONDALE: The U.S. has important interests in assist-
ing the countries in the region to develop self-sustaining 
economies. The C.B.I. could have been an effective 
regional development initiative, but it has been damag-
ed by the administration's inept presentation and 
handling . 
The initial proposal showed for the first time the 
Reagan administration's recognition that the crisis in the 
region is caused not just by outside intervention, but also 
by indigenous social and economic problems. However, 
by failing to build on existing regional institutions, the 
Reagan administration turned what could have been an 
important multilateral development tool into a unilateral 
program enmeshed in the administration's short-sighted 
and misguided approach to the region. This discouraged 
support for the program among Democrats, such as the 
Congressional Black Caucus, who in the past have played 
key leadership roles in promoting development assistance 
for the Caribbean. It also placed proposed recipients in 
the awkward position of appearing to endorse Ronald 
Reagan's world view. 
Still, I believe a development initiative directed toward 
the Caribbean is necessary and could be important if there 
were some changes in our approach. Realistic participa-
tion by the smallest nations in the region is not possible 
unless we increase aid for basic infrastructure; private in-
vestment is not likely without it. Secondly, the U.S. 
should encourage regional integration rather than under-
mining regional institutions like the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank. Third, the U.S. should promote jobs and self-
sufficiency by encouraging agricultural development and 
labor intensive investments. 
What position would your administration take on African 
regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Sahara? 
MONDALE: A Mondale administration would seek to 
prevent the intervention of outside forces who exploit 
African regional conflicts for their own benefit. We 
would understand the complex historical background of 
conflicts such as exist in the Horn and the Western Sa-
hara. Where we discerned Soviet exploitation of such con-
flicts, we would join with African allies to pressure the 
Soviets to withdraw. 
African nations oppose foreign intervention in their re-
gional conflicts. I would have the U.S. join with them, 
if invited, to assist the Organization of African Unity in 
fulfilling its mandate to find a peaceful solution to con-
flict in the region . The OAU is seized with the problems 
of the Horn and the Western Sahara at this time and is 
seeking to forge a settlement based upon the principles 
of (a) acceptance of pre-independence borders, (b) self-
determination, (c) non-intervention, and (d) settlement 
through negotiations rather than violence. In my judg-
ment, these OAU principles form a sound basis for a set-
tlement. While making our own position clear, however, 
we should not intervene in OAU deliberations in ways , 
that divide the Africans or obstruct their chosen pro-
cesses. 
What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee 
laws and practice would your administration implement? 
What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other 
black refugees? 
MONDALE: America is diverse because we have been 
the most open and generous nation on earth. Each year 
we accept more immigrants and refugees than the rest of 
the world combined. I believe we must continue this his-
toric policy. To slam the door on immigration-as some 
have suggested-would be to deny our past and im-
poverish our future. 
There continues to be an intense debate over reform 
of the immigration laws in the Congress. Rather than of-
fering specific changes in the law, let me share with you 
some of the principles that I believe ought to guide our 
efforts. 
First, we must move toward legalizing the status of 
most individuals currently working and residing within 
our borders, to guarantee their basic human rights and 
fair treatment in our society. 
Second, we must recognize our special relations with 
nations near us. 
Third, we must reject all attempts-such as the Reagan 
administration's guestworker initiative-to turn the clock 
back to the days of the bracero program. 
Fourth, our immigration laws must be publicly accept· 
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able and enforceable. But enforcement must be consis-
tent with the civil liberties of all. Last year's nationwide 
"Operation Jobs" dragnet was an affront to every His-
panic in this country. 
Fifth, immigration is a national responsibility. I was 
pleased by the Supreme Court's decision requiring states 
to provide public education for all children-whatever 
the origin and status of their parents. But this Constitu-
tional requirement should be backed by federal assistance 
to those states that will incur large new costs as they carry 
out their legal duties. 
Finally, the challenge of immigration cannot be ad-
dressed just within our borders. American foreign poli-
cy must work for a world in which no one is compelled 
by poverty or fear to leave the land of his birth. 
That means support for economic development. We 
should provide the nations of this hemisphere more 
schools, more fertilizer, more rural roads-not more guns 
and more missiles. 
It means an all-out effort to prevent the collapse of 
the international banking and financial system and en-
hance the capacity of developing countries to service their 
huge debts. 
And most of all, it means an American policy that 
works for peace and reconciliation throughout the strife-
torn nations of the region. 
Under whatever immigration law the Mondale admin-
istration is governed, we will administer the Jaw to pro-
vide equal treatment to black refugees. Racism has no 
more legitimacy in the application of the immigration law 
than it has elsewhere in our society, and I will not permit 
or tolerate it. □ 
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